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**A Theater of War Big Enough for all Services:
The U.S. Army's Operational Role in the United States
Pacific Command**

**A Monograph
by
Major Richard L. Elam
Infantry**



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**School of Advanced Military Studies
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The purpose of this monograph is to determine what should be the U.S. Army's operational role in a maritime theater, specifically the United States Pacific Command (USPACOM). In order to determine the Army's operational role in USPACOM, the paper seeks to answer two questions. First, what should operational art look like in USPACOM? Second, what criteria can be used to determine the Army's operational role in USPACOM?

A review and analysis of current joint doctrine determines that operational art in a maritime theater is no different from any other theater. The operational operating systems outlined in TRADOC Pam 11-9 (DRAFT) are used as criteria to determine the Army's operational role in USPACOM.

The conclusions show that the operational operating systems in TRADOC Pam 11-9 (DRAFT) are valid criteria for determining the operational role of any service. There are a host of functions that must be accomplished at the operational level of war and one service cannot accomplish them all. The paper concludes that the Army does have a viable and important operational role in USPACOM. In these times of shrinking resources, the CINC cannot afford to overlook assets of any particular service.

School of Advanced Military Studies
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Name of Student: Major Richard L. Elam
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Command

Approved by:

James J. Schneider Monograph Director
Mr. James J. Schneider, M.A.

William H. Jones Director, School of
Colonel William H. Jones, M.A. Advanced Military Studies

Philip J. Brookes Director, Graduate
Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D. Degree Programs

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ABSTRACT

A THEATER OF WAR BIG ENOUGH FOR ALL SERVICES: THE U.S. ARMY'S OPERATIONAL ROLE IN THE UNITED STATES PACIFIC COMMAND. by Major Richard L. Elam, USA, 50 pages.

Force reductions brought about by reduced spending will almost certainly take place in the near future. This has surfaced an old debate. The debate centers around the U.S. Army and the U.S. Marine Corps and their respective roles in the defense establishment. Many question the need for two ground force components. Since the Soviet threat in Europe is dissipating, the Army seems to be the service struggling for survival instead of the Marine Corps.

Concurrently, the United States and the world seem to be taking a renewed interest in the Pacific region. The Pacific is becoming one of the strongest regions in terms of economic growth. It is also one of the most militarized regions of the world, possessing seven of the world's ten largest armies.

The purpose of this monograph is to determine what should be the U.S. Army's operational role in a maritime theater, specifically the United States Pacific Command (USPACOM). In order to determine the Army's operational role in USPACOM, the paper seeks to answer two questions. First, what should operational art look like in USPACOM? Second, what criteria can be used to determine the Army's operational role in USPACOM?

A review and analysis of current joint doctrine determines that operational art in a maritime theater is no different from any other theater. The operational operating systems outlined in TRADOC Pam 11-9 (DRAFT) are used as criteria to determine the Army's operational role in USPACOM.

The conclusions show that the operational operating systems in TRADOC Pam 11-9 (DRAFT) are valid criteria for determining the operational role of any service. There are a host of functions that must be accomplished at the operational level of war and one service cannot accomplish them all. The paper concludes that the Army does have a viable and important operational role in USPACOM. In these times of shrinking resources, the CINC cannot afford to overlook assets of any particular service.

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Section I
INTRODUCTION

Reduced spending and force reductions in the United States' defense structure are inevitable. The evaporating Soviet threat in Europe will likely cause a two-thirds cut in the number of U.S. forces currently stationed there.(1) Oddly enough, the trend of spending less on defense was begun long before the recent events in Europe. The present administration, supported by Congress, has proposed to continue the trend of spending less than previous years on the annual defense budget.(2) The Army is likely to bear the brunt of the proposed force reductions. The two divisions that will be removed from Europe will in all likelihood be taken out of the force structure completely.(3) As the Soviet threat in Europe decreases and as the Army begins to shrink, government officials, the military, and the public have resurrected an old debate.

The debate centers around the U.S. Army and the U.S. Marine Corps and their respective roles in the defense establishment.(4) Since both services are primarily ground force oriented, the question arises as to the need for two similar forces. In the past, the Marine Corps has been at a disadvantage when this question has been debated and has usually had to struggle for its survival. The tables are somewhat turned now that the Marine Corps has firmly established

their heavy force projection role.(5) The Army now finds itself in the position of having to publicize its capabilities in order to halt what might turn into a crusade to take Army force structure down to unacceptable levels in order to balance the nation's budget.

Other troubles loom on the horizon for the Army. Focus is gradually shifting from Europe to other theaters. This compounds the Army's problem, since it has long been associated with large ground forces stationed on the continent of Europe. In fact, the Army can rightly be accused of having a European bias.(6) The shifting focus is a result of economic and political reality. As our trade with countries in other parts of the world increases, it follows that more of the United States' attention should be given to those nations. Furthermore, armed forces in other regions continue to grow and have become more sophisticated. As a result, our allies in these regions have called on the U.S. for a commitment to safeguard trade routes and the theater in general.

The Pacific region is a classic example, as the United States has shown a great deal of renewed interest there.(7) Yet, this maritime region has a long association with the Navy and Marine Corps. Because of this, the region has been dominated by naval thought and naval forces. The Pacific region may well replace

Europe in the position of importance and focus. For this reason, the U.S. Army must become familiar with the Pacific and publicize its ability to contribute to the region's defense.

But many will question the Army's reason for being in a maritime theater. They will accuse the Army of trying to take over the role of the Marine Corps since they can no longer afford to focus on the European plains.(8) Contrary to what many think, the Army has been active in the Pacific for quite some time. The Army has fought in the Pacific theater six times in this century.(9) But, history seems to dwell on the tactical exploits of Army units in these instances and does little to justify the Army's existence in a maritime theater today.

The utility of having Army forces in the Pacific goes beyond their use as a tactical force, which is what the debate over roles is about. In today's contemporary view of warfare, the services not only have tactical roles, but have roles at the operational level as well. If it were determined that the Army had a valid operational role in a maritime theater, squabbling over tactical roles and missions would be unnecessary.

This monograph seeks to determine what should be the U.S. Army's operational role in a maritime theater. Two out of the five geographical unified commands are maritime in nature. I have selected the Pacific region

as a context in making this determination due to the renewed focus there. In order to determine the Army's operational role in the Pacific region, two questions must be answered. First, what should operational art look like in a maritime theater, in this case the United States Pacific Command (USPACOM)? Second, what criteria can be used to determine the Army's role in USPACOM? As such, the paper is presented in five sections, the first being the introduction. Section II presents a more detailed analysis of the Pacific region. Section III answers the first of the above questions as it presents my view of what operational art should look like in a maritime theater. Section IV answers the second question as it presents the six operational operating systems listed in TRADOC Pam 11-9 (DRAFT) as the criteria for determining the Army's operational role in USPACOM. It also presents examples of operational roles for the U.S. Army in USPACOM through application of the six operational operating systems in certain scenarios and situations. Finally, Section V concludes with a summarization and offers some recommendations based on material presented in the previous sections.

Section II
THE PACIFIC REGION

Many experts are beginning to refer to the 21st century as the Pacific Century.(1) Size alone makes the region worthy of the title. However, economic growth is the primary reason that these experts have bestowed such a title. In the next ten years, many of the most important security, economic, and political challenges faced by the United States will emerge from the Pacific region.(2) For those not familiar with the Pacific, a brief analysis of the area's geographical nature, its economy, the threat, and the likelihood of conflict may prove beneficial. This especially applies to Army personnel, for our friends in the Navy and the Marine corps have been aware of the region's importance for some time. This section provides that analysis.

The area we are concerned with has definitive boundaries. It is the area for which the United States Commander in Chief, Pacific Command (USCINCPAC) has responsibility. I hesitate to use the term theater of war or theater of operations at this time because they will be discussed later. For now, I will refer to it as the Pacific region or USPACOM. This region is even larger than one might initially realize.

USPACOM is a vast region covering three oceans: the Pacific, the Indian, and the Arctic. The Navy views USPACOM as a huge expanse of blue water; the Air Force

sees the region as a never ending swath of blue sky. But the Army sees huge land masses containing sixty percent of the world's population.(3) USPACOM not only includes all the land masses that are in these oceans, but China, India, Mongolia, the Korean peninsula, and all of Southeast Asia as well. Alaska and the Aleutian islands have recently been added.

The land masses lying in the oceans are formidable. They include Australia, Japan, New Zealand, Indonesia, The Philippines, New Guinea, Madagascar and numerous other island chains. It is this diverse make-up of large and small land masses, dispersed over half the world's surface that makes the Pacific region both unique and challenging.

The economic growth of the Pacific region is the primary reason that more attention is being paid to it. The Pacific has become an important trade center for the United States and the world. This has caused a sudden rise in the internal economic growth in many of the countries in the region. As a result, the Pacific rim has become extremely important to the world's economy.

It should be no surprise that the region has become the world's largest producer of consumer products. Japan has been a leading producer of consumer goods for some time. But recently the newly industrialized nations of South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong have joined Japan in producing huge quantities of

consumer goods. Many feel that China is close on their heels.(4)

Even though most of the consumer goods production centers around the Asian sector, the entire region takes on importance in other ways. Other nations in the region provide various resources: fish, food, minerals, raw materials and more. As a result, over five thousand ships are sailing in the Pacific's sea lanes on any given day.(5) The many sea lines of communication have created a world transportation hub. Even so, the United States has begun to look at the region with a different focus.

The Pacific nations have become the United States' most important trading customers. Over 40% of the United States' trade takes place with Pacific nations compared to 21% with European nations.(6) On the other hand, the United States is equally important to one of its sister Pacific nations, as it absorbs close to 40% of Japanese exports.(7) All of this trade activity has provided excellent opportunities for internal economic growth for many of the Pacific nations.

Economists commonly use gross national product (GNP) as a measure of economic strength. First, consider that the GNP of the United States is one of the highest in the world. Japan is closing the gap and by the year 2000, the sum total of the GNP's of Japan, China, South Korea, Hong Kong, and Singapore will at

least equal that of the United States.(8) As for the entire region, the economic growth of Pacific rim nations is rising faster than western Europe's.(9) The Pacific region appears to be economically strong for a long time in the future, especially when you consider that the United States is also a key Pacific nation. This translates to potential dominance of the world economy by the Pacific region for some time.

The United States has dominated the world economy at least since the end of World War II. It was the strength of the dollar that rebuilt the war-torn economies of western Europe and Japan. The rebuilding of Japan was so successful that the Japanese can now be considered the world's most powerful economic actor.(10) Even so, they may soon be challenged by China or South Korea.(11) This does not imply that the United States is not currently one of the world's strongest economic leaders, because it still is.(12) Whether it be the United States, Japan, China, or South Korea, the world's economic leader is destined to come from the Pacific region.

The nature of the threat in the Pacific region is equally spectacular. There is no commonly perceived threat in the region. As such, there is no collective security arrangement as exists in Europe with NATO. Instead, a collection of bilateral alliances tenuously hold the region together.

Seven of the world's ten largest armies are located in the Pacific region.(13) More than ten million soldiers are under arms there.(14) A nuclear threat exists as well. China and India have tested nuclear devices and Japan, Pakistan, and Taiwan have the capability to produce them rapidly.(15) A familiar adversary has become a relatively new player in the region, the USSR.

The Soviets have done several things in the past few years to increase their presence in the Pacific. On the economic side, they have sought to increase trading ties with Japan and the newly industrialized countries.(16) Militarily, their naval presence in the Pacific Ocean is formidable and continues to grow. The Soviet fleet in Vladivostok and Petropavlovsk is the largest of their four and numbers over eight hundred ships.(17) Soviet ground forces in the region have more than doubled in the past years to five hundred thousand soldiers or fifty-nine divisions.(18) The Soviet presence and threat in Europe may be diminishing, but the growing Soviet presence in the Pacific may mean that the threat is simply shifting.

With a threat as potent as this, the likelihood of war is always uncertain. Recent events in Europe are leading us to believe that a major conflict with the USSR is unlikely.(19) Although a major high-intensity conflict is not anticipated in the near future, the

chances for a low- or mid-intensity conflict in the Pacific region increase daily.(20) The multipolar nature of the region promotes instability. The situation on the Korean peninsula has yet to be resolved in favor of a lasting peace. The huge armies of North and South Korea continue to honor the 1953 armistice, but are only separated by a, in name only, demilitarized zone. There are several forces in the region that openly oppose democracy, the governments of China and North Korea and insurgents in the Philippines to name a few. The number of U.S. ground forces available in USPACOM to counter this threat is not too impressive.

Major Army forces in USPACOM include one army headquarters, one corps headquarters, three infantry divisions, one national guard infantry brigade, one national guard infantry group, one military police brigade, one military intelligence brigade, one engineer group, one support group, two support commands, and numerous other combat support and combat service support units brigade size and smaller.(21) The Marine Corps has one division in USPACOM and one division on the west coast of the continental United States not under USPACOM control.(22)

The Army also has forces located on the west coast that can quickly reinforce or come under the control of USPACOM. They include one corps, two infantry divisions, one motorized infantry brigade, and one air

defense artillery brigade.(23) There are numerous national guard units available, as well as other active combat, combat support, and combat service support units brigade size and smaller.

With all these Army forces either in or readily available to USPACOM, it seems that the Army's role is both secure and obvious. But it is not that clear and simple.

The fact remains that the most likely threat in the Pacific region is in the low intensity arena. There is also growing evidence that a Marine Corps combat unit may be the tactical force of choice for this role.(24) Should mid- or high-intensity conflict occur in the Pacific region, no one would deny that the Army will be needed. However, the Army's role in low-intensity conflict is less obvious.

This brief analysis shows the Pacific region to be economically important to the world, militarized, and volatile. The Pacific region is strong in many ways and continues to grow stronger. Furthermore, in spite of a large representation of Army forces in the region, there continues to be uncertainty as to what their role might be.

Section III
OPERATIONAL ART IN THE MARITIME THEATER

In order to determine the Army's operational role in USPACOM, we must determine what operational art looks like in a maritime theater. Operational art is not some subject studied and practiced by only the Army. At least it is not supposed to be. Operational art is spelled out in current joint doctrinal manuals and publications and therefore, all services are obligated to practice it. I must assume that the reader has some working knowledge of operational art and its terms. This section will review operational art with emphasis on how the joint doctrinal manuals envision its practice. The meaning of maritime theater will also be analyzed in this section. From that, we will be able to determine what operational art should look like in our maritime theater, USPACOM.

A review of operational art should start with a look at the structure of modern warfare to see where it fits. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Publication (Pub) 3-0, Doctrine For Joint Operations lists three levels of war; the strategic, the operational, and the tactical.(1) A good many of us are most familiar with the tactical level, because we have spent the majority of our time at that level. We are also acquainted with the strategic level, because our histories often focus at that level. We are less comfortable with the

operational level. Because of this, it might be helpful to associate the levels with something about which we know more.

Most of us associate the levels of war with the type of combat that occurs in them. The tactical level of war is the level at which battles and engagements are planned and executed.(2) Battles and engagements usually last hours and sometimes days.(3) Campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted and sustained at the operational level.(4) The activities of a campaign or major operation take on a broader dimension of time and space than do tactics.(5) They can last weeks or months. The strategic level of war is the level at which a nation's strategic war plans are executed.(6) Wars, sometimes lasting years, are associated with the strategic level.

Now that we know where operational art fits in the structure of modern war, we need to know what it is. Our doctrine says that operational art is, "the employment of military forces to attain strategic goals in a theater of war or in a theater of operations through the design, organization, and conduct of campaigns and major operations."(7) The campaign concept is important to operational art.

The campaign is a series of unified operations designed to attain strategic and operational objectives in a theater of war or theater of operations.(8) The

term "unified operations" connotes joint. U.S. Army Field Manual 100-5, Operations actually uses the phrase "joint actions" instead of "unified operations" in its definition of operational art.(9) The important point is that the use of joint forces in a campaign is a key characteristic of contemporary operational art. Dwight D. Eisenhower was one of the first to recognize this. Shortly after World War II, he stated that the days of services fighting independently were a thing of the past.(10) Joint and Army doctrine support this belief.

In order to execute a campaign, the operational commander must have a campaign plan. The campaign plan should assist the commander in answering three important questions:(11)

- What military conditions must be produced in the theater of war or theater of operations to achieve the strategic goal?
- What sequence of actions is most likely to produce that condition or conditions?
- How should the resources of the force be applied to accomplish that sequence of actions?

In other words, the operational commander must determine the ends, ways, and means.

Determining the ends, or the military conditions that must exist at the end of the campaign, requires the operational commander to translate strategic guidance and objectives into an operational objective or objectives. The operational commander may have to conduct more than one campaign in order to achieve the

desired end state. This is an initial step in determining the ways.

Determining the ways, or the sequence of actions and events which will most likely produce the desired end state, forces the operational commander to decide who to fight, where to fight, and when to fight. Before doing that, the operational commander must consider the means at hand to do this.

The means, or the resources to be applied in order to accomplish the sequence of events needed to bring about the desired end state, are what we are most concerned with in this paper. Forces are a resource and forces are what the services have to offer the operational commander. This will be important in determining the Army's operational role in USPACOM.

The operational commander has been mentioned several times now. Our joint doctrine specifies who the operational commander is and where he is to practice operational art.

The National Security Act of 1947 allowed for the creation of our present system of unified and specified combatant commands. We are concerned for our purposes with the unified commands. Armed Forces Staff College Publication 1, The Joint Staff Officer's Guide describes a unified combatant command as, "a command which has broad, continuing missions and which is composed of forces from two or more military departments."(12)

Presently, we have five unified commands whose responsibilities are based on a general geographic area; USPACOM is one of them. Each of these unified combatant commands is assigned a commander who is responsible for all joint operations within his designated area.(13) The commander is more commonly referred to as the commander-in-chief or CINC.

The CINCs of the unified combatant commands have overlapping strategic and operational responsibilities. At the strategic level, the CINC translates national strategic tasks, objectives, and direction into a theater strategy.(14) But he also has responsibilities at the operational level. JCS Pub 3-0 says, "a CINC plans his campaign for war, and when war comes, executes his campaign through the application of operational art."(15) Joint doctrine, then, says that the CINCs of the unified combatant commands are operational commanders. Giving the CINC strategic and operational responsibilities creates confusion. However, joint doctrine assists the CINC in clarifying the operational role.

JCS Pub 3-0 states that when a CINC determines that he should subdivide his theater of war to contend with one or more threats, he may designate subordinate theaters of operations for each major threat.(16) The commanders of these subordinate theaters of operations are tasked to practice operational art, too. Theater of

operations commanders develop campaign plans to support the CINC's theater of war plan.(17) The joint doctrine is specific in its expectations of who should practice operational art. The doctrine is likewise specific on where operational art is to be practiced.

The terms "theater of war" and "theater of operation" have been used throughout this section and need to be addressed in further detail. From our definition of operational art, we have seen that operational art is practiced in both. The problem is how to differentiate between the two.

When the CINC works to develop theater strategy and war plans, he does so for his theater of war. The theater of war strategy includes the use of all the elements of national power, including the military, to achieve desired strategic goals.(18) Theater of war then, connotes strategy which means all available elements of national power in the CINC's theater.(19)

When the CINC or his designated theater of operations commander develops operational campaign plans, he concentrates on applying military power to achieve the operational end state.(20) The operational commander must consider the other elements of national power, but he concentrates on the military. Theater of operations then, connotes operational art which translates to the military element of power.

The CINC's theater of war is referred to as a

"theater" in peacetime. JCS Pub 1-02, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms defines theater as, "the geographical area outside the continental United States for which a commander of a unified or specified command has been assigned military responsibility."(21) That leaves us with the term "maritime theater."

Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary defines maritime as, "of, relating to, or bordering the sea."(22) Our nation has a long history in the usage of the term maritime. We have used the seas as a means of trade since the time of the earliest settlers. We have always considered ourselves to be a maritime nation and continue to do so today.(23) From the above definition and as a result of our long time familiarization with the term "maritime," the use of the term "maritime theater" can be interpreted as meaning a theater that consists mostly of and bordered mostly by water. But the usage of this commonly accepted term is misleading to many uniformed officers.

The term "maritime theater" does not exist in JCS Pub 1-02. Although it is often used in articles and even in some government publications, I can find no definition for the term in any of the JCS series publications. Then why is it used at all? As stated before, our historical familiarity with the term causes its casual use by many of us. Otherwise, the continued official use of the term seems somewhat beneficial to

one service in particular, the Navy.

The United States Navy has been concerned with the development of strategy for some time. This concern for strategy has been necessary for them for many reasons. If a service bases its existence on a particular strategy, it stands to gain a lion's share of the overall defense budget.(24) The Navy currently believes in and publicizes what it calls the maritime strategy.(25) Maritime strategy emphasizes the use of naval forces as a means to handle all crises across the entire operational continuum.

It is not my intent to join the debate on the Navy's maritime strategy. My reason for introducing the subject is to explain why the accepted use of the term should not be taken for granted. Carl H. Builder has written a lengthy paper and a book, both seeking to explain why the services think and act like they do. For many reasons, and Mr. Builder covers them all, the Navy is more comfortable talking about strategy and tactics than it is the operational level of war.(26) Therefore, the use of the phrase maritime strategy, maritime nation, maritime theater, and maritime anything is both calculated and important to the Navy. This has certain implications for USPACOM.

USCINCPAC has traditionally been a naval officer. Since the region is "maritime" in every sense of the definition, there is nothing wrong with this. But it

does mean that the theater is dominated by naval thought. This, and the constant use of the term "maritime theater," create the potential of providing a license to think only in terms of naval forces using naval tactics and practicing naval strategy. The fact that the Pacific region is maritime and the fact that the senior military commander has traditionally been a maritime officer does not mean that official literature must cave in to tradition or common use of a term. In fact, it has not.

Operational art in USPACOM and United States Atlantic Command (USLANTCOM), maritime theaters by our definition above, should look no different than it does in any of the other theaters. In fact, operational art as spelled out in our doctrinal manuals may be better suited for maritime theaters.(27) The manuals do not specify the level of command and the size force that must be solely concerned with operational art. Small land, air, and naval forces often achieve significant results in insular campaigns, and operational art in USPACOM may closely resemble this.

The CINC of a maritime theater must use the ends, ways, and means formula in designing his campaign plan, just as any other CINC. After assessing the situation he must determine the military conditions that must exist at the end of his campaign, the ends. He must then determine the forces, both size and type, that he

will use and the way he will use them to achieve the desired end state, the means and ways. This is what operational art looks like in the maritime theater.

Section IV THE ARMY'S OPERATIONAL ROLE IN USPACOM

In general, the operational role of the services is to provide resources to the CINC. The resources that the services have to offer are their forces and equipment. All services have been tasked by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to maintain these forces in a trained and ready status for use by the unified combatant commanders.(1)

We need to determine a more specific operational role for the Army by determining the types of resources, or forces, the Army can provide to the CINC. The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) has drafted a document that can provide us with the criteria to do this. TRADOC Pam 11-9 (DRAFT), Army Programs, Blueprint of the Battlefield proposes a list of operational functions which can be used in articulating and relating Army responsibilities to mission achievement.

There are six operational functions, or operational operating systems, listed in TRADOC Pam 11-9 (DRAFT). They are: operational movement and maneuver, operational fires, operational protection, operational command and control, operational intelligence, and operational

support. The operational operating systems are the major functions performed at the operational level of war for successful execution of campaigns and major operations.(2) Each function has several subfunctions and each subfunction has one or two layers of subfunctions under it. An explanation of each operational operating system in great depth would be beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, a brief overview of each operating system will be presented for familiarization purposes. An analysis as to how certain Army units can accomplish some of the operating system's subfunctions will be made in conjunction with this overview. Operational roles for the Army can be proposed as a result of this analysis.

The proposals for operational roles will not form an all inclusive list. Only a sampling of the operational operating systems' subfunctions will be addressed. Furthermore, how the Army unit performs the operating system subfunction will be viewed from a USPACOM perspective. A better understanding of the Army's operational role in USPACOM will be gained as a result.

These roles are applicable across the operational continuum, just as the operational operating systems are. However, it is wise to keep in mind that low-intensity conflict is both anticipated and probable in USPACOM.(3) Also, as stated previously, USCINCPAC is

likely to lead with a Marine Corps tactical unit as the combat force of choice, making it imperative that we better understand, and master the ability to articulate, the Army's operational capabilities and roles in USPACOM.

"The operational movement and maneuver operating system is the disposition of forces to create a decisive impact on the conduct of a campaign or major operation by either securing the operational advantage of position before battle is joined or exploiting tactical success to achieve operational results."(4) The major subfunctions are: conduct operational movement, conduct operational maneuver, provide operational mobility, provide operational countermobility, and control operationally significant areas.

Specifically, operational movement means to regroup, deploy, shift, or move operational formations from one position in the theater, usually less threatened, to a more decisive point.(5) Here, a decisive point translates as gaining an advantageous position over the enemy. Even though operational movement is frequently associated with large units, scale alone does not denote the operational level.(6) Therefore a division size unit can be considered an operational force.

USCINCPAC may be better served in certain situations by moving an Army division instead of a

Marine expeditionary force (MEF). If USCINCPAC is forced to move an operational force inland on one of the huge land masses in the theater, with little or no notice, the Army division has certain advantages. First, it can respond faster and second, it is not tethered to the coast like the MEF.(7) USCINCPAC has a greater range of choices in conducting operational movement since he has the two Army light divisions under his direct control.

Operational mobility facilitates friendly operational movement and maneuver by not allowing operationally significant terrain or obstacles to delay operational formations. Ports, transportation systems, mountain ranges, major rivers, river deltas, and marshland are examples of operationally significant terrain and obstacles. Operational mobility is enhanced by preparing or improving such things as rivers, canals, roads, railroads, ports, and facilities.

Operational countermobility denies the enemy the use of operationally significant terrain through the emplacement of operational obstacles. Operational obstacles are also emplaced to delay, channel or stop enemy operational formations.

Army engineer units are particularly well suited to perform the operational mobility and countermobility subfunctions. These units can construct or rehabilitate roads, air landing facilities, petroleum storage and

distribution facilities, railroads, pipelines, and port facilities in order to enhance the movement of operational formations.(8) They can also emplace or create operational obstacles.

The USPACOM theater offers many opportunities for the use of Army engineer assets. The theater's numerous islands, both large and small, range from well-developed to undeveloped. Most operations here depend on the use of one or more port facilities. In some cases, such as Subic Bay Naval Base in the Philippines, the port takes on an importance in and of itself. Regardless of the size or location of the operation, USCINCPAC will need engineer assets to prepare or improve port facilities and transportation networks. Army engineer units can be deployed by platoon, company, battalion, or brigade and therefore, can be tailored to any situation the CINC encounters.

"The operational fires operating system is the application of firepower to achieve a decisive impact on the conduct of a campaign or major operation."(9) The major subfunctions are: to process operational targets and to attack operational targets. Operational fires are not fire support, therefore operational maneuver is not dependent upon them. Processing operational targets is the selection of targets and the allocation of assets. Operational targets are those with operational significance and can be ground, air, or naval. They are

usually proposed by the staff and approved by the commander. Operational fires on these targets isolate the battlefield, destroy critical functions and facilities that have operational significance, and facilitate maneuver by creating gaps.

The attack of operational targets is usually accomplished by assets other than those required for the routine support of tactical maneuver. The general impression is that operational fires are provided by theater air forces. However, they also include ground long range cannon, rockets, missiles, and special operations forces. TRADOC Pam 11-9 (DRAFT) says that surface delivery systems will be used more frequently as operational fires in the future because of their increasing capabilities.(10) But in USPACOM, the ranges of the Army's surface delivery systems may be acceptable even now.

The Army's Lance missile system has a range of 75 kilometers and the multiple launched rocket system (MLRS) has a range of 30 kilometers and is air transportable.(11) Although these ranges seem small for operational purposes, compared to the ranges needed for operational fires in other theaters, they may be suitable for most situations in USPACOM. The same is true for rotary wing aviation. The destructive power and range of today's Army aviation, combined with the general characteristics of the theater, will enable it

to achieve decisive impact against operational targets in USPACOM.

The Philippines islands are a good example. The Navy and Air Force facilities at Subic Bay and Clark Air force Base are essential to power projection capabilities in USPACOM and are threatened by the ongoing communist insurgency.(12) Should the situation escalate and cause costly Navy and Air Force assets to be removed for their safety, Army field artillery and aviation units can replace them and provide operational fires. This arrangement is even more advantageous should Naval air become unavailable due to pressing needs elsewhere or weather restrictions.

Special operations forces (SOF) can also be used to deliver operational fires.(13) SOF units can be deployed quickly, anywhere in the theater of operations. Their ability to be inserted by air or from the sea makes the use of SOF desirable in a maritime theater. Although the Army does not comprise 100% of the total U.S. SOF capability, it does make up the majority.(14)

"The operational protection operating system is the conservation of the fighting potential of a force so that it can be applied at the decisive time and place."(15) The major subfunctions are: provide operational air defense, provide protection for operational forces and means, employ operational security (OPSEC), conduct deception in support of

campaigns and major operations, and provide security for operational forces and means.

Operational air defense protects such things as ports, key bridges, and operational command and control facilities. It concentrates on the use of aircraft, including helicopters, to destroy enemy air forces in the air and on the ground and also the use of air defense artillery to guard against enemy air attacks on operationally significant facilities.

The operational air defense role in USPACOM can be performed by Army air defense artillery units and Army aviation units. Army air defense artillery units can provide the necessary protection of command and control facilities, ports, airfields, and support facilities. They can be deployed in any size unit configuration to meet the needs of USCINCPAC in various locations and situations.

Attack of enemy air forces, airfields, and air force support facilities is a form of air defense. These facilities are operational targets by our previous definition. The use of Army aviation and SOF as operational fires to attack operational targets has already been discussed. Army aviation and SOF used in this manner in any similar USPACOM scenario perform the dual functions of providing operational fires and operational protection.

Security at the operational level is much like that

at the tactical level. It is employed to protect the operational forces and means from surprise, observation, detection, interference, espionage, and sabotage.

Protecting the force in a maritime theater may be particularly challenging. Although smaller operational and tactical maneuver forces are likely to be used in this type theater, their support structure may be spread over thousands of miles of water. Operational support units and facilities may be isolated on one island, while the operational maneuver forces are on another. This is a familiar scenario for the Pacific. General Douglas MacArthur's forces moved across the South Pacific in much the same manner during World War II. A situation such as this increases the demand for additional forces to perform the protection function.

Army military police units can be used to safeguard operational forces in certain situations. One particular example of this is the safeguarding of maritime pre-positioning force (MPF) ships during off-loading operations. The Marine Corps discovered the vulnerability of these assets while off-loading during recent exercises in the USPACOM theater.(16) It seems that Marine Corps assets are unable to safeguard the MPF ships while they are building combat power ashore. Since MPF units will likely be used early in any USPACOM scenario, protection of these assets is important. Army military police units can be deployed with or soon after

the MPF unit and can provide the necessary protection during off-loading.

The use of deception at the operational level is designed to manipulate the enemy operational commander's perceptions and expectations in order to create a false picture of reality.(17) Operational deception is used to protect the details of the friendly campaign to the greatest extent possible. Successful deception at the operational level entails having an operational deception plan from the beginning and throughout the campaign, allocating resources to that plan, and assessing its effects.

Army forces may be particularly useful in an operational deception role in USPACOM. Headquarters elements from the corps or divisions can be broken away from their subordinate units and deployed to any part of the theater as an economy of force effort to accomplish this deception. If entire units are needed for an operational deception story, Army units can be put on ships or can be flown to any part of the theater of operations while other Army or Marine Corps units are committed at the tactical level.

"The operational command and control operating system is the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned operational forces in the accomplishment of the mission."(18)
Command and control functions are performed through an

arrangement of personnel, equipment, facilities, and procedures. TRADOC Pam 11-9 (DRAFT) agrees that command and control is frequently a joint activity at the operational level of war.(19) The major subfunctions of operational command and control operating system are: acquire and communicate operational level information and maintain status, asses the operational situation, determine operational actions, direct and lead subordinate operational forces, and employ command, control, communications countermeasures (C3CM).

Acquiring operational level information is a staff function that entails gaining information about the theater of operations. It includes gaining information about the objective, the enemy operational forces, terrain, weather, and friendly forces. Operationally significant data must be received and communicated from one echelon of command to another by any means.

Assessing the operational situation is a staff and commander responsibility. It enables both to determine the need for future campaigns and major operations. Maintaining operational information and force status allows the staff and commander to asses the operational situation quickly and accurately.

Since many of the subfunctions are staff related responsibilities, the operational command and control operating system relies mainly on trained personnel. Army personnel in division and corps level headquarters

are familiar with joint and combined operations, particularly those currently serving in the USPACOM theater.(20) These headquarters can be used as a nucleus for forming a joint headquarters or individual personnel can be taken and placed into existing or newly formed joint headquarters.

These Army headquarters have the equipment, mobile facilities, and training to perform the operational command and control function. They can also be used as an alternate or reserve operational command and control headquarters.

Directing and leading subordinate operational forces is a command function similar to that at the tactical level. Like the tactical commander, the operational commander must create the command climate necessary for the prosecution of our current doctrine. He must give clear guidance, state his intent, practice decentralization, and encourage initiative. All senior Army commanders receive training and are well versed in joint doctrine. Should USCINCPAC need to form a joint task force (JTF) that requires mostly land forces, the Army corps or divisions currently in theater certainly have the capabilities and training to meet the challenge.

The operational intelligence operating system centers around that intelligence which is required for the planning and conduct of campaigns and major

operations within a theater of operations.(21)
Operational intelligence differs from tactical intelligence. At the operational level of war, intelligence must be broad and must probe the mind of the enemy commander.(22) The major subfunctions of the operational intelligence operating system are: collect operational information, process operational information, and prepare operational intelligence reports.

Information collected at the operational level must include information on friendly vulnerabilities. It must also include information on threat operational doctrine and forces, air, land, and naval. Information collected on the nature and characteristics of the area of operations, to include natural and man-made hazards, is also important.

The processing of operational intelligence is the development of the operational situation and operational targets. In the processing phase, operational information must be converted into useful intelligence through collation, evaluation, analysis, integration, and interpretation.

Operational intelligence reports include estimates and reports prepared on the threat operational situation, intentions, and high-payoff targets. They also include reports on characteristics of the theater of operations, friendly vulnerabilities, and anything

else appropriate at the time.

The Army's military intelligence community can perform all the subfunctions of the operational intelligence operating system. Army military intelligence personnel are well trained to plan and conduct intelligence efforts at the operational level. Many of them have worked on joint and combined staffs throughout the world.

The intelligence cell of an Army corps is well versed in the collection, processing, and preparation of operational intelligence function. The corps intelligence cell must be able to perform all the major subfunctions required by the operational intelligence operating system.(23) Like the Army engineering units, Army intelligence sections or combat electronic warfare intelligence (CEWI) units can be broken down to any echelon to support the needed operational headquarters.

In certain situations, USCINCPAC may need an intelligence element or unit in a location for an extended period of time. Furthermore, he may have a need to place an intelligence unit further inland on some of the larger islands or on the Asian continent. Both of these conditions call for Army intelligence units, which do not require support from the sea, as Marine Corps intelligence assets do.

"The operational support operating system consists of the logistical and support activities required to

sustain the force in campaigns and major operations within a theater of operations."(24) There are numerous subfunctions within this operating system. They are: arm, fuel, fix and maintain, man the force, distribute stocks and services, maintain sustainment bases, conduct civil affairs, and evacuate non combatants from the theater of operations.

Arming, fueling, fixing, maintaining, manning the force, and distributing are normally thought of as tactical actions and are considered service responsibilities. They remain service responsibilities at the operational level. However, operational support involves more than execution. It involves the planning and preparation for support of campaigns and major operations. This is mostly accomplished at the operational headquarters, which was discussed earlier in the operational command and control operating system.

Perhaps the Army is better prepared than any of the other services for civil affairs activities. Army civil affairs units comprise the majority of all civil affairs units in the Department of Defense. In fact, the only active civil affairs battalion belongs to the Army.(25)

Civil affairs units are useful throughout the operational continuum. They are extremely useful in operations short of war and in low-intensity conflict though. A recent low-intensity conflict exercise, using the Philippines as the scenario, conducted at the School

of Advanced Military Studies at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas revealed that civil affairs units were needed long before combat and combat support units. As discussed earlier, low-intensity conflict in USPACOM rates high on the probability scale. At any time, USCINCPAC could have a need for most or all of the Army's civil affairs units.

The six operational operating systems provide the structure for determining what means, or resources, are needed to achieve the desired operational end state. Each service has various resources, units or forces, which can be tasked to accomplish some or all of the subfunctions of each operating system.

There are many operational roles for the Army's three divisions and its corps which are currently under USCINCPAC's control. Whether or not the CINC should use an Army or Marine Corps combat unit for a tactical or operational mission can always be debated. In our case, we concentrated mostly on the use of combat support and combat service support units and how they could best perform some of the subfunctions of the operational operating systems. Analysis shows that there are many uses for Army units in USPACOM, especially when you consider that only a very few of the operating systems' subfunctions were addressed here.

Section V
CONCLUSION

The importance of the Pacific region increases daily. The region is important to the world and to the United States. It may very well become the center of economic power, if it has not already, by the next century. Because of its importance to the United States and because it is an extremely militarized theater, it takes on added significance to uniformed service personnel.

Our review of operational art has determined what it should look like in a maritime theater. Although the use of the term maritime theater is acceptable, it is misleading. Operational art should look no different in a maritime theater than it does in any other theater. Our joint doctrine does not classify theaters as maritime or continental. It directs the warfighting CINC and his designated theater of operations commanders to execute their campaigns through the application of operational art.(1) To do this properly, the operational commander must select the proper means, or resources, needed to prosecute the campaign towards the desired end state, regardless of whether it is a maritime theater or not. This means that no particular service should be considered more important than another. The services should be viewed as how they can best provide the needed resources to the CINC.

This monograph has examined the six operational operating systems of TRADOC Pam 11-9 (DRAFT). The operational blueprint provides a structure for assessing the relative contributions that any of the service's forces can make to the CINC's campaign plan.(2) The operating systems are not a prescription list for certain success. Instead, it is a list of minimal considerations specifically intended for the practice of operational art. The operational operating systems, then, are valid criteria for determining the relative contributions of any service for the prosecution of operational art.

Joint doctrine directs the services to provide trained and equipped forces to the theater CINCs.(3) This is the general operational role of the Army. Analysis of the six operational operating systems determined that the Army does have specific operational roles in USPACOM. Yet, many subfunctions were not addressed in the analysis. This leads to the conclusion that there are many, possibly infinite, operational roles for the U.S. Army in a maritime theater.

One of the more important conclusions that should be taken from this paper is that joint operations are essential for successful prosecution of campaigns. If the operational operating systems offer a list of minimal considerations for prosecuting a successful campaign, then other considerations surely exist. No

one service can possibly provide all the means needed by the operational commander. There is no need to fight over roles and missions, for TRADOC Pam 11-9 (DRAFT) shows that there are more than enough tasks for all services, and it does not profess to cover them all.

Since joint operations are so vital to the success of the campaign, the services must work harder to understand each others capabilities. This is especially true in the Army's case in USPACOM. The Army must publicize its operational capabilities in some way. USCINCPAC and his staff are probably very much aware of these Army capabilities. But the future USCINCPACs and USPACOM staff officers need to know, now, that the Army is not trying to steal the Marine Corps' role. The Army could never replace the Marine Corps anymore than the Marine Corps could replace the Army.(4) Some universal method of determining operational roles of the services must be established.

TRADOC Pam 11-9 (DRAFT) is a good way to start. The six operational operating systems are a good tool for determining roles for all the services. It is also a useful tool for the CINCs and their staffs in determining what is needed to execute a successful campaign plan. As such, it should be converted into a JCS publication and established as joint doctrine.

Finally, all services must gain a better understanding of the current joint doctrine. It is

explicit in how, where, and who should practice operational art. It does not designate one service as more important than another. They are all equally important. Joint doctrine does stress the achievement of strategic goals through the unified action of all services. And as this paper has shown, there are many functions that must be accomplished to get to this desired end state. Thus, USPACOM, like any other theater, is a theater big enough for all services.

ENDNOTES

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5. Donnelly, p. 3.
6. Dale C. Eikmeier, "We Need a Stronger Army Strategy in the Pacific," Army, 39 (August 1989), p. 9.
7. John Miller and Fred Rainbow, "Interview: General Alfred M. Gray, Jr., Commandant of the Marine Corps," Proceedings, 116 (April 1990), p. 48.
8. Matthews and Willis, p. 4. See also Hittle, p. 23.
9. Eikmeier, p. 9.

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3. Ibid., p. 1.
4. Powell, p. 44.

5. William Matthews, "The New Threat: A CINCS-eye View of the Post-Cold War World," Army Times, February 26, 1990, p. 51
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7. Powell, p. 45.
8. Ibid., p. 45.
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15. Anderson, p. 27.
16. Powell, p. 51.
17. "WESTCOM Command Briefing," p. 21.
18. Ibid., p. 23.
19. Anderson, p. 27.
20. Matthews, p. 12.
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22. U.S. Department of Defense, Defense 89, September/October, (Alexandria, VA: September 1989), p. 43.

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3. U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-5, Operations, (Washington, D.C., May 1986), p. 10. Hereafter cited as FM 100-5.
4. JCS Pub 3-0, p. I-5.
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